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Author's Angle 
 
Bearing in mind the dynamism of developments both in social life (in particular Post–
Communism) and social discourse (in particular Political Correctness), and wishing to 
avoid misunderstandings, it seems expedient to make explicit a few assumptions in 
this paper. The term “politics” and its derivatives is used in the narrow sense, meaning 
activities to do with the direct wielding of public power, or of state power, be it 
central or local. This approach is closely tied to the main thrust of the paper, which is 
interested only in such characteristics of political behaviour in Bulgaria after 1989 
that have clearly elevated – or debased – the quality of democracy in Bulgaria. This, 
of course, leaves out numerous important activities of governing, party acts and 
citisens' initiatives, which are outside the scope of this study. 
 
From the Fall of 1947 to the Fall of 1989 Bulgaria was an (imperfect) totalitarian 
state, in the sense that the state did attempt to govern as much of the lives of its 
subjects as it could, while, at the same time, depriving them of virtually any say in 
state matters. The most significant social division was that between “the governing” 
(the “haves” of 
political power), and “the governed” – the “have nots”. 
 
The political fact that the governed had no power resulted in the socio–psychological 
phenomenon of mass fear. The governed would fear the governing, and this fear 
would normally become the basic framework of their social and individual behaviour. 
It is just this type of political and social dichotomy that was ended in Bulgaria in the 
period November 1989 – November 1991. The tools were so simple that they were 
formulated as early as at the Round Table Talks (between the still ruling Communist 
Party and the Opposition) in early 1990: a multi–party system, based on universal 
suffrage; and a market economy, based on private property. That was the sum 
definition of democratisation at that point. It must be made clear that this process was 
supposed to be initiated centrally, by the government, it being seen – after years of 
centralisation – as the only body that could handle such an immense task. 
 
These considerations form the basis of interest in political behaviour stricto sensu in 
its relevance to the democratisation of the state. The transformation of a totalitarian 
state into a non–totalitarian one has been so far the paramount goal of the changes in 
Bulgaria. 
 
A last caveat seems pertinent: defining this process as democratisation makse use of 
the Round–Table terms cited above. It looks as if a swing of the pendulum worldwide 
has pushed societies of different cultures and expectations towards “democracy”. But, 
were we to try to define this democratic trend on the basis of the features of the 
“developed” (Western? Anglo–Saxon? European?) democracies, we would end in the 
inanity of a Kirkpatrick–type conclusion: “Democracy is part of ours, and they are not 
us, therefore...” It seems more promising – at least theoretically – to try the inductive 
alternative. This would mean establishing, on a country–by–country basis, the local 
political and/or social meaning of “democratisation”, and then measure progress (if 
any) by such a locally derived yardstick. We could also, of course, fish for 
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similarities,but we would then most probably catch just a few general trends, which 
would not be of much help if we try to explain or predict local process. 
 
It could be safely argued that the “world democratic tendency” comprises some 
universal characteristics (these vary according to schools of thought), such as: 
redistribution of power to benefit the individual at the expense of the state; division of 
state power rather than its accumulation in the hands of a dictator; rationality of 
governance guaranteed by informed and informing media; and an ideology of 
freedom rather than an ideology of equality. Yet such generalities do not lead to an 
understanding why, for example, a Nigerian sociologist said some time ago that a 
military coup would help democratisation in his country. On the face of it, a coup is 
not a pro–democratic gesture; but I'd rather trust this judgement of the Nigerian 
colleague than dismiss it on grounds of definition. 
 
 
Behavioural Circumstances: the Consensus 
 
Our subject matter naturally seems to fall into two distinct types of behaviour: that of 
the post–communist “governing” group, and that of the “governed”. In the new 
circumstances, however, both groups began by displaying behavioural similarities, 
thus making distinctions difficult at this point.  
 
Both demonstrated a mixture of behavioural patterns borrowed from: 
 
(a) the non–democratic years (Turkish authoritarianism – until 1878;  
Csarist authoritarianism – 1934 to 1944; communist dictatorship – 1947 to 1989), 
and 
 
(b) the period of relative democracy (1879 – 1934). 
 
This mixed common heritage of the two major groups in society largely accounts for 
the particular – and sometimes peculiar – ends and means of the Bulgarian transition. 
It should be noted that in 1989 – 1990 there was a tacit consensus among both 
governing and governed as to the overarching goal: that the totalitarian system should 
be destroyed. The means to this end were not a matter of consensus as they were not 
very clear to anybody. But there was, again, consensus on one vital limit: no shedding 
of blood should be involved. Apparently, the public had come to equate violence with 
the old system, and nobody could envisage it as a tool of change away from that 
system. 
 
The first free elections in June 1990 signalled that the first goal – bloodless 
emergence from the old regime – had been achieved. A second implicit consensus 
then emerged: that a radical economic reform should begin. The limit of this: anything 
but starving people. Then, by the fall of 1992, a third consensus gradually formed, this 
time on foreign relations: that Bulgaria should engage in a war on the Balkans only in 
case that it were directly invaded by a foreign power. This attitude functions as the 
“foreign complement” to the domestic “no blood” consensus. With some optimism, it 
may be concluded that the Bulgarian public has learned a basic negative lesson from 
its totalitarian experience: namely, that it does not pay to kill people in order for 
society to achieve a positive goal. 
 3 
One of the more tangible signs, in 1990, of the end of totalitarianism was the 
disappearance of fear. After the elections, perceived as fair and democratic, the 
“governed” stopped being afraid of the “governing”. This was all the more 
remarkable, as the “governing” circle remained the same – at least in terms of image. 
In fact, a narration of the way the ex–communists were forced into retreat – having 
won elections – illustrates an entirely new awareness on the part of the “governed”. 
 
To begin with, it was the ex–communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) who won the 
elections (with 47 per cent of the votes to 38 per cent for the major competitor, the 
Union of Democratic Forces – UDF). Yet the “governed” behaved as if the Socialist 
Party had in fact lost the elections. This was true for both the electorate of the 
opposition and – more significantly – for the electorate of the BSP itself. 
 
What is more, it was true even of the BSP government. Its Ministers felt very 
illegitimate and behaved accordingly, creating the impression of lack of resolution 
and a kind of veiled guilt. Initially, they tried to draw the opposition UDF into a 
coalition government; the UDF promptly declined the offer. Then the BSP's President, 
Petar Mladenov, was charged by the opposition with undemocratic behaviour for 
something he had allegedly said in private (the famous debate: “Did he, didn't he say, 
'It is better for the tanks to come'?”). He denied the charge. Evidence was produced 
exposing him as a a liar – and after a student sit–in and some rather mild and peaceful 
street demonstrations he resigned, less than a month after the BSP victory. 
 
A stalemate followed in Parliament, because a two–thirds majority was required to 
elect a new President. Ultimately, the BSP climbed down and accepted the candidate 
of the UDF, its then Chairman Dr Zheliu Zhelev. With BSP votes the dissident 
philosopher became President. Five months after the elections, the UDF attacked the 
BSP government without any spectacular charge. There were some demonstrations 
and the UDF–affiliated trades unions threatened a national strike. The socialist 
government fell, and a provisional government was established, with strong UDF 
presence (the UDF had a Vice Prime Minister, and Ministers of Economics and 
Finance). The “governing class”, which for Bulgarians at that time was synonymous 
with “communists”, was in visible total retreat.  
 
During this series of events in the summer and Fall of 1990, at some stage the 
“governed” realised for the first time in their lives that their free vote had made them 
partners to state power. After this point the totalitarian dichotomy of governed vs. 
governing stopped making sense. The post–communist cleavage, which structures this 
analysis, is the opposition of party vs. electorate. 
 
Why parties, rather than the “political class” or “power elite”? There are at least two 
reasons for this. First is the simple fact that there is no longer one, but many parties. 
This represents the most momentous change from the past. (And many they were: 
about 120 political parties were formed by the end of 1990.) In the eyes of the 
public, for the first time people in power were no longer an opaque and alien “they”: 
they were a group which was split along clear party lines, known to “us”, and 
dependent on “our” vote. To dissolve all of this into a common pool called “political 
elite” would mean to miss the new perception of politics that Bulgarians developed in 
1990–1991 – and, of course, to miss the new reality. 
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Parties are, second, the medium through which individuals reach into the state as a 
whole, since the parties control the legislative, executive and judiciary. The fact that 
even the trades unions have on several significant occasions acted like political parties 
highlights the point: at present, for better or for worse, parties are the major 
instruments of Bulgarian democracy. 
 
 
Parties Legitimacy: Authoritarianism 
 
It was assumed that parties who serve the cause of democracy, in order to be 
legitimate, should be themselves democratic. It was soon discovered, however, that 
the ubiquitous vernacular definition of “democratic” – “unlike what it was under 
communism” – is difficult to apply to parties. Some features of the new parties turned 
out to be very similar to the old Communist Party, yet this fact did not automatically 
make them illegitimate. Besides, double standards are usually applied when judging 
the legitimacy of one's “own” party and that of the “others'“. A consideration of the 
party system as a whole is a useful entry into this problematic. 
 
Elections in 1990 and 1991 have shown that many parties are formed, about half of 
them participate in elections, and very few get into Parliament. This means, on the 
one hand, that besides some abuses of the media on the part of eccentric would–be 
politicians, the electorate retains a healthy conservatism and is not swayed easily by 
populist rhetoric. On the other hand, many voters end up without representation in 
Parliament, as their votes go to parties who are unable to pass the 4 per cent 
Parliamentary threshold demanded by the existing electoral system. 
 
This was the case in the 1991 general elections. A purely proportional system was 
adopted for the distribution of the 240 parliamentary seats. Sixty–one parties put up 
candidates, of which 31 were grouped in 9 electoral coalitions. The UDF got 34.36 
per cent of the vote; the BSP coalition attained 33.14 per cent; the party of the ethnic 
Turks, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, weighed in at 7.55 per cent. All the 
others remained below 4 per cent; of them, two agrarian parties got 3.86 and 3.44, 
while two UDF splinter groups achieved 3.20 and 2.81 per cent of the vote. 
 
Including non–voters, this means that about one–third of the electorate was not 
represented in Parliament. Consequently, the legitimacy of Parliament and the 
government, despite some initial democratic euphoria, was not high from the very 
beginning. The BSP had the complicated task of balancing the contradictory 
requirements of avoiding change, so as to retain its electorate, and of changing, in 
order to acquire democratic legitimacy. It quickly opened up its governing structures 
and purged them of the communist “old guard”. As a result, the party became fairly 
decentralised in appearance. In reality, power inside its structures was not threatened 
from below. While at the top of the Socialist Party decisions were taken after fairly 
normal deliberation, rank–and–file members would usually react to them following 
the old pattern: top–level decisions are treated as unquestionable orders from above. 
The party changed its name from Communist to Socialist, but that remained the only 
major symbolic gesture of change. It did not dissociate itself from the Bulgarian 
Communist Party tradition, dating from 1891; and despite repeated urging (both from 
inside and outside the party) throughout 1990, it did not offer an “apology” to the 
Bulgarian people for the 45 years of its rule after 1944. 
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When it changed its name, a negligible group seceded to continue under the name 
Bulgarian Communist Party. This groups has remained marginal in politics. In 1993, 
there was another split, when one of the more popular of the younger Socialist 
leaders, Alexander Tomov, decided to go it alone, forming a “Citizens' Union for the 
Republic”, without being able to take practically any BSP electorate with him. A 
social–democratic faction within the party continues to be tolerated. The refusal to 
criticise its communist past, and the splits at its periphery, slowed the process of the 
BSP's legitimisation – but has enabled the Socialists to keep most of their party's 
electorate. By the end of 1993 even its legitimacy problems found a solution. Opinion 
polls revealed that the BSP was finaly seen as a legitimate political party both by the 
electorate at large and by the UDF's own voters. There was one caveat: the BSP's 
current legitimacy goes as far as participation in the political process, but does not 
include its taking executive power. This public opinion is not prepared to approve. 
The UDF was established at the end of 1989 as a loose coalition of parties and 
formations which, by the time of the Round Table three months later, had developed 
tacitly into a close–knit coalition. This development was chiefly a reaction to the 
continuing unity of the still formidable communists. 
 
The Union was composed of two main types of formations. The first were groups and 
movements that had been in active opposition to the dictatorship in 1987–1989. These 
had no experience of party politics and included groups such as the Ecoglasnost 
environmentalists, the Club for Glasnost and Democracy (which ultimately produced 
the first UDF President, Dr Shelev), the Podkrepa Independent Trade Union, the 
Association for Defence of Human Rights, and the Independent Student Association. 
The second type comprised some traditional (for the pre–communist period) 
Bulgarian political parties which had been revived right after the fall of the 
dictatorship and became co–founders of the UDF. Of these, the UDF housed the 
resuscitated Social–Democratic Party, the Radical Democratic Party, and the Agrarian 
Union. A little later, the revived Democratic Party also joined. These older “party” 
people proved to be better professional politicians than the oppositionists of the 
1980s. 
It soon began to look as if the latter would have to become more party–like, or leave 
the UDF and the power struggle. They had popularity, but manifestly lacked the 
structures for making politics; they also lacked an adequate attitude towards power. 
Repeatedly, they had declared that they were only interested in attaining those limited 
issues on which they had been formed and on which they had campaigned, and were 
not after gaining political power per se. Moreover, a considerable part of their 
popularity was due exactly to their declared intention to keep off state power, for that 
kind of power was still associated with the communists. 
 
However, once the UDF was created, the 1980s opposition groups found themselves 
facing the communists, the revived older parties, and other groups – all of them 
struggling for control over the state. If a group wanted to be a success in this situation, 
it had to produce both a new structure and a new ideology, and constitute itself as a 
political party. To remain in the UDF and not to develop so would have made them 
powerless and a tool for others to use. The alternative would have meant leaving the 
UDF and facing accusations of “splitting”, “treason” and “selling out to the 
communists”. 
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It is not then surprising that these groups started reforming along party models. Some 
even managed to reform along communist–party models, reproducing a typically 
communistic centralised hierarchical structure and authoritarian decision–making 
process. A case in point was the Human Rights Association. It developed a rigid 
structure and started recruiting members on a partisan basis, mainly among the ethnic 
Turks, whose rights it had defended in the past. However, when the ethnic Turks left 
to form their own party, the Association, though still represented in the UDF, became 
politically dead. 
 
New people filled these new structures and some of the old oppositionists left. This 
withdrawal was seen as clearing the way for the “second wave” of the opposition. 
Unlike the first wave, composed of people who operated in the hostile communist 
environment and wanted a vague kind of democracy, the second wave formed in a 
friendlier post–communist climate and were clear on wanting political power in the 
name of a vague democracy. The new groups became the natural motors of further 
change: the first wave had either to integrate itself with them or be pushed out. Both, 
in fact, happened. The two “moderate” UDF splinter groups who failed to cross the 4 
per cent threshold in the 1991 elections are an example of the latter. 
 
Within six months of winning the 1991 elections, the UDF developed a rigid 
hierarchical structure which cut across the coalition parties. Local structures became 
bureaucratically linked to the central governing body of the Union, the Coordinating 
Council, by–passing the structures of the constituent parties. From a close–knit 
coalition the UDF turned into a loosely–knit party with a heavy apparat, numerous 
problems and few reasonable remedies. A most disturbing example of this process 
was the suspension, in July 1994, of the Democratic Party, the most influential 
party of the Union. The reason was deviation from the Council line. 
 
The uncompromising “hardliner” attitude of the UDF against all “moderates” and the 
Councils' party building went well down with the electorate until the summer of 1993. 
Since then, the UDF has been losing popularity steadily. Currently, its vote is down to 
the “hard core” supporters. National surveys and local elections alike (in Veliko 
Tarnovo in June and in Sandansky in July) have revealed the hard–core UDF 
electorate to be significantly smaller than its BSP counterpart. Without losing 
legitimacy, the UDF did manage to squander a lot of support. The MRF draws its 
legitimacy from two complementary kinds of bigotry. First is the bigotry of an ethnic 
and religious minority which understands democratic representation in terms of 
ethnicity and religion: only an ethnic Turk or a Muslim can “understand” and thus 
“has the right to represent” ethnic Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria. Therefore, ethnic 
Turks and Muslims are expected to vote MRF as a matter of course.  
 
Second, there is the bigotry of the majority: ethnic Bulgarians and Orthodox 
Christians are deemed to be different from the rest of the inhabitants of Bulgaria, and 
they constitute the overwhelming majority; democracy is based on majority rule; 
therefore, the Bulgarian Orthodox majority should rule the country, and anybody who 
is not happy is free to emigrate. However, so far the MRF has been supported by 
practically all ethnic Turks and most Muslims in Bulgaria, while only a handful of 
ethnic Bulgarians have joined, part of them highly principled persons, and the rest 
very much the opposite. For very unselfish or very selfish career reasons, MRF 
dignitaries are so keen on having a minority party that they pointedly avoid criticising  
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its leader for his authoritarian style. The MRF was thus mostly built personally by its 
leader in 1990. Since then, despite dissent and coup attempts by ex–followers, Mr 
Dogan has retained supreme executive authority in his party. 
 
From an abstract point of view, this is often seen as a realistic strategy, given that the 
ethnic Turks still live in traditional patriarchical communities and possibly would not 
respect a non–authoritarian leader. On a more concrete level, however, it is revealing 
to learn that Mr Dogan has not allowed his party's accounts to be audited since its 
foundation four years ago. Nevertheless, Ahmed Dogan has been able to triumph over 
all challenges, and the party's legitimacy has not been questioned. Apparently, the 
MRF does not need to be democratic to be legitimate. It draws its legitimacy not from 
the situation within the party, but from the situation the party is placed in by outside 
forces. 
 
All the other parties are democratic both in statute and in deed. Only the ones that 
have manifested enough behaviour of their own will be briefly discussed. In the 
current UDF coalition of about sixteen members (the number shifts as parties get 
expelled, suspended, or they return, or split inside, or unite with others), there are only 
two parties which are developed enough to merit separate attention. The first is the (at 
present still suspended) Democratic Party. It is in a class of its own, being the only 
party in Bulgaria that represents if not a class, at least a brand new social stratum: the 
so–called “restitutes”, or persons who have benefited from the restoration of 
nationalised urban property. It is also historically legitimised through the pre–war 
party of the same name and, mutatis mutandis, of similar conservative leanings. 
Interestingly, these old–new wealthy persons, who owe their restored status to 
democracy, recently tend to lose interest in the DP – and, indeed, in UDF politics in 
general. It increasingly looks as if, after getting back their real estate, they care not for 
politics. And this may mean that the DP is losing part of its unique source of 
legitimacy. 
 
The other UDF party of consequence is the Radical Democratic Party. In the inter–
war period, it was a party of the left–of–center intelligentsia. Now it is right–of–center 
and has remained attractive to intellectuals. Its Chair also chairs the National 
Assembly, which in Bulgaria is a primary post of power. In the last few months, the 
RDP, together with the DP, have been opposing the radicalism of the UDF central 
leadership. Although the RDP is still a full UDF member, both parties might secede 
before the end of the year, leaving the UDF with second–rate formations as members. 
 
Of the extra–Parliamentary parties with centrist potential, there are the Bulgarian 
Party Liberals, the Alternative Socialist Liberal Party, and the Green Party. If they 
could produce an united effort (which does not seem likely), they could become 
important. It is remarkable that the New Union for Democracy, a grouping consisting 
mostly of ex–UDF MPs and not a fully–fledged party, makes much more effective 
centrist politics than all these three parties put together. 
 
The left–of–center is represented by the recent coalition of the Bulgarian Social 
Democratic party and the BSP splinter Citisens' Union for the Republic. The two 
make uneasy bed fellows: the BSDP draws its legitimacy from its glorious pre–war 
history, while the CUR can only boast of its recent split from the BSP. The Agrarian 
Union (or unions; the various Agrarians are always on the verge of reunification or  
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further splits) also draws on its glorious history, and has nothing to show in the 
present. Still, it managed to enter parliament in 1990 and would have matched the 
MRF in 1991 had it not split into a handful of quarelling factions. 
 
A very simple pattern emerges. Parliamentary parties are rather authoritarian; 
authoritarianism is both a cause of their getting into Parliament and an effect of this. 
And, in both cases, it is a means to ensure discipline and unity of effort. Extra–
Parliamentaary parties are non–authoritarian. Although objectively moderate and 
centrist, they have no chance on the big arena of politics, as they are riven with 
disagreements, both internal and among the different parties. Their traditional weak 
spot is leadership. 
 
 
Leadership: Power as Privilege and Corruption 
 
Charisma has not played an important part in Bulgarian party politics. Even if a leader 
does possess a modicum of charisma, it is not for this that s/he retains the leadership. 
Rather, leadership is regarded as a job requiring business qualities. Many leaders tend 
to regard their political position as a personal business – aimed principally at direct 
personal profit. It may be worth noting that this attitude does not necessarily entail 
corruption – if corruption is taken to mean that a politician agrees to do something 
s/he knows to be against the best interests of their party or nation in return for money 
or favours. Rather, it is in the tradition of both democratic and communist rule in 
Bulgaria to regard political power not as a position of service, but as a post of 
privilege. It is a question of using a public position for personal gain. The interests of 
the party or the nation tend to be situated at another level. Despite the fact that such 
lucrative stratagems occasionally get devastating coverage in the media (especially in 
papers controlled by opposing parties), such revelations, though usually believed by 
most of the rank–and–file, do not seem to have any effect on their allegiance. The rare 
politician who, on the contrary, makes a point of not engaging in such practices, risks 
the label of “naif” or, even worse, “idealist”, both being political synonyms of 
“misplaced”. 
 
Currently it looks as if the only person exempt from such dismissive judgements is the 
President. The fact that he is not making a personal fortune while in office is not held 
against him for the moment. Corruption of the more trivial kind is universally 
believed to be ubiquitous. Reactions to it are, however, slightly different. When 
accusations of this kind appear in the media, they are usually vague and no facts are 
published, although they are declared to be in the possession of the publisher. The 
accused would threaten or occasionally even begin a libel suit; and usually there the 
matter ends. This, for example, is what happened when, in 1992, UDF Prime Minister 
Filip Dimitrov charged with corruption his own Defence Minister Dimitar Loudshev; 
or with accusations made both by and against trade union leader Konstantin Trenchev. 
Party adherents tend to disbelieve such accusations levelled against their own leaders, 
writing them off as “enemy stratagems”. The most common accusations are that the 
politician has been “bought” by a domestic business group or by a foreign political 
power. If proven to the public's satisfaction, such an allegation might kill a politician's 
career. As yet, such cases do not seem likely. 
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On the whole, in terms of image the UDF tends to lose more than the BSP when its 
leaders are accused of corruption. After all, the UDF came into existence in the name 
of a new political morality. As for the ex–communists, given the burden of the 
communist regime's inheritance, they can not be easily harmed by petty new 
accusations. 
 
 
Rank–and–File: Clientelism 
 
A collateral to the attitude of power–as–privilege is the clientelistic syndrome of the 
rank and file. It is most probably rooted in the traditionalistic character of practically 
all Bulgarian communities at the end of the 19
th
 century, delayed in their development 
by the 500 years of Turkish domination. These communities lived by a collectivistic 
value system. The individualistic revolution which began after the liberation from the 
Turks and was concomitant with modernisation and urbanisation, was checked after 
the disaster of World War I, when large sections of the intelligentsia became 
communist–oriented. Nevertheless, the process of creating citisens and civil society 
continued to evolve in ups and downs, until the communist seisure of power in 1944 
put a stop to the process. The communists opted for a collectivistic personality 
instead, and started grafting it upon the extant tradition–regulated small–community 
personality. 
 
To solve problem situations which transcend their fixed roles in the community, 
individuals need outside help. If they do find it – in outside persons – they “borrow” 
their power, and become “clients” to these outside “patrons”. In the pre–war years of 
democracy, such clientelism was based on family ties, common place of origin and/or 
political partisanship. Clients expected to solve their problems by receiving political 
appointments or other favours. These were granted not for particular services to the 
patron, but for just being des notres, for sharing with the patron a common origin or 
party affiliation. Clients would also expect to be used by the patron, but again only 
because they shared a common group identity with him/her, and not in return for 
specific favours received. In the years of communism, the Communist Party was the 
only one capable of providing such favours. Membership became a must – at least for 
the patron that wanted to get ahead; the family or place of origin ties remained as 
relevant as before. 
 
Nowadays clientelism continues to be a major phenomenon in Bulgarian political life; 
it is being reproduced without significant changes. The newly born and the revived 
political formations inherited it from both the communist and democratic traditions. 
The clientelistic style may be largely to blame for the low popularity in the country of 
the Union of Democratic Forces – and for its steadily dropping popularity in the big 
cities. It looks as if, in the country, the old clientura of the ex–communists consisted 
of better respected persons (due to lifestyle, education and intelligence, but also to 
morals); and these people remained overwhelmingly faithful to their old party.  
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The new clientura of the UDF in the country was mostly formed of outsiders on the 
lookout for the chance of becoming arrivistes. They adopted an ultra–radical stance, 
accused the non–clientelist (the more reasonable and moderate) activists of 
collaboration with the communists, grabbed power posts in the UDF hierarchy and 
started losing votes steadily. Polls reveal that at present, in 1994, the UDF, which 
managed just to win the 1991 general elections, does not stand a chance against the 
BSP. 
 
 
Party Image: Media Control 
 
One of the basic features of the democratic past, which has been revived with success, 
has been the newspaper. Even in Turkish times newspapers of good quality, critical of 
the Porte or overtly revolutionary, would be printed in Constantinople and Bucharest 
and distributed in Bulgaria. The press between 1989 and 1992 resembled the press 
after 1878 in its aggressive style: it was free, often brutal and gross, manipulative and 
lively – and managed to remain so, despite attempts of parties and governments to 
bridle it. After 1992, things have been settling down. There are some 10 private, i. e. 
not party affiliated, national daily newspapers of consequence. The most influential of 
them are 24 Chasa (controlled by private business), Standart (ditto) Trud (trade 
union), Continent (left–of–center), Otechestven vestnik (center). There are also 
private local 
newspapers, covering the country thoroughly and nearing national standards (e. g. the 
Plovdiv Maritsa). Bulgarians learned quickly to demand that news and commentary 
be separated, which has become part of the new rules of the game between journalists 
and the public. 
 
Many private FM radios have sprung, mostly for music, commercials and local news; 
the National (state owned) Radio and Television is still the main national and foreign 
news source. Private TV channels were allowed by Parliament only recently, (in 
March 1994), and do not broadcast yet (although there were private political TV 
shows) on the state channels. Interestingly, it was the UDF government which, in 
1992, tried to bring the media under state control again. After failing spectacularly to 
make the big private papers obey, the UDF Prime Minister declared that these papers 
would be “disregarded”. Meanwhile, a campaign to practically “re–statify” the 
electronic media was launched: every item critical of the UDF government was 
denounced as “communist”. The campaign succeeded with TV and – to a large extent 
– with the National Radio: besides being controlled by Parliament according to the 
Constitution, these establishments have a long tradition of obeying.  
 
This should not be seen, however, as a fight between the “good” media and the “bad” 
state. The media are fully aware of their advantageous potential as institutions of 
opinion manipulation. Journalists who do not attempt to manipulate are a minority. 
The battle is over whether the media have the right to choose the manipulation, or 
someone else (the government or the parties) chooses it for them to execute. 
Politically, the negative feature of the media is that they are constantly attempting to 
manipulate the public; the positive side is that, especially in the case of the press, 
messages of manipulation do not emanate from the government, and are many and 
contradictory; so Bulgarians, especially older ones, who were used to read the 
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Communist Party newspapers between the lines, do not swallow much of the 
proffered stuff. 
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Doing the Job: Three Compromises 
 
The spirit of consensus at the beginning of democratisation is doubtlessly a very 
important positive feature in Bulgarian political life; even should it be broken, it is 
bound to be remembered and to facilitate compromise between parties in situations of 
crisis. Moreover, it might not have arisen in the first place: it is something quite novel 
in Bulgarian politics. Another new trait, which has appeared only in the last six 
months, is that parties and the government have started to trust independent experts of 
political analysis, rather than relying exclusively on in–house advice. The recognition 
that there are limits to vulgar politicising and that there is an outside community of 
experts who aim at objectivity looks very promising. 
 
 
Compromising with the communists: the case of the Constitution. 
 
In four and a half years of post–communism, Bulgaria survived three Parliaments, 
four prime–ministers and five governments (plus several cabinet reshuffles); two 
presidents; and three sets of local governments. One of the reasons why the country 
did survive may be the fact that all these changeovers took place without practically 
any violation of existing laws and according to provided procedures. This 
commitment to doing things by the book even under most pressing circumstances 
should help understand why Bulgarians preferred to “waste” time on a new  
Constitution, when, for example, it was clear that the lack of new financial and market 
legislation would mean in hunger for the country back in 1990. In contrast, almost all 
other ex–communist states chose another option and started with specific laws. 
 
This other approach may have seemed more practical; besides, the UDF was still in 
opposition then and radicals were warning that the new Constitution was bound to be 
communist–oriented. Yet the UDF decided to compromise. It seemed that for 
Bulgarians a new Constitution would carry enormous symbolic significance. This was 
apparently seen by the UDF and taken into account when estimating practical returns. 
It did not follow to the letter the country's first Constitution, passed in the 19th 
century following the liberation from the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria remained a 
republic in the 1990s. But it did imitate that original Constitution in its democratic 
spirit. It enlarged, for example, the scope of individual rights and restored private 
property. There are “time bombs” in the text, and a case of dealing with one of them 
follows. 
 
 
Compromising with “internal” nationalism: the case of the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms. 
 
Ethnic minorities in Bulgaria are constitutionally non–existent. The Constitution does 
not in principle grant any group rights. It is presupposed that ethnic minority members 
will get enough defence of their rights on and individual basis. One of the new 
institutions which this Constitution established was the Constitutional Court: an 
independent body of judges pronouncing on cases where an interpretation of the 
Constitution is necessary. One of the first cases it had to examine was the case of the 
ethno–religious Movement for Rights and Freedoms. Some BSP MPs were claiming 
that the MRF was a political party based on ethnicity, therefore unconstitutional  
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(which it was), so the party should be banned from the general elections of 1991 
(which should not have happened). The Court declared the MRF legal, as it had 
already been registered under the election law, which did not prohibit such parties.  
 
This was probably bad constitutionalism. but it was sound judgement. For good or 
bad, the MRF had become the only party to represent the Turkish minority – and this 
minority simply had to be represented in Parliament. To ban this party might have 
engendered civil strife, and apparently the judges felt the consensus command: “no 
blood”. 
 
 
Compromising with “external” nationalism: the case of Macedonia. 
 
The neutrality of the Army at the time of the anti–communist coup in 1989 set the 
happy precedent of non–intervention of the Army in politics. This was furthered by 
the prompt depolitisation of the Army. This newly acquired military placidity was 
patently demonstrated when Bulgaria became the first country in the world to 
recognise the ex–Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (together with all the others ex–
Yugoslav states) in January 1992. 
 
The military, along with all Bulgarians, were weaned on the idea that Macedonians 
were ethnic Bulgarians, unfortunately under Serbian and Greek domination. The 
decision to recognise Macedonia was taken by the President; it put an end to territorial 
and national claims that were centuries old and were deeply ingrained in the national 
psyche. At the same time, the declaration paid courtesy to “external” nationalists: it 
said explicitly that Bulgaria, while recognising the Macedonian state, did not 
recognise a Macedonian nation. 
 
For short–sighted Macedonians this meant non–recognition: for Bulgarian 
nationalists, it meant a betrayal of “our brothers living in Macedonia”; yet the 
overwhelming reaction both in Bulgaria and Macedonia was one of relief. Bulgaria 
was relinquishing its territorial claims and launching a new style Balkan behaviour. 
Paradoxically, Western Europe was infuriated; comments were made that Bulgaria 
should have waited for the European Community to decide on recognition first. The 
Community demonstrated that it did not understand how precarious peace on the 
Balkans is, and how important prompt reactions can be. 
 
 
The Electorate 
 
It would seem logical to divide the electorate into urban and rural, for two reasons. 
First, in 1991 cities voted overwhelmingly pro–UDF, and villages – pro–BSP, which 
made the vote–locality correlation patent. Second, a locality–medium of influence 
correlation was assumed at the time: citisens, being more individualistic and 
atomised, 
would be influenced politically mainly through the media; while villagers, being more 
collectivistic, would tend to adhere to a local consensus and usually would judge 
media messages with the help of local political pundits. 
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Fieldwork has revealed that, although broadly true, this assumption needs 
specification. Researchers presupposed that a vote in the villages would not be a truly 
“democratic” vote in the sense of it being based exclusively on informed and rational 
individual political choice. Obviously enough, the dependent members of a village 
family (especially the elderly) would “naturally” be swayed by the political advice of 
the person they are dependent upon. Moreover, the social space between the families 
is organised in fairly stable “networks” for exchange of material and spiritual goods 
and services. This is typical and trivial enough for village communities. 
 
Also typical is the fact that political ideas, patterns of behaviour and direct influence 
can circulate through such networks. What is not so trivial is the fact that networks of 
similar functionality were found to exist in cities as well. Urban society in this 
country proved to be less atomistic than expected. It should not be assumed that such 
urban networks are basically rural networks simply translated into a new milieu 
through a kind of diffusion process. The urban networks are generated in the city 
itself. Their primary cause seems to be the mass migration in Bulgaria. 
 
In the 20 years following World War II, about 30 per cent of the population changed 
from rural to urban. Before the war the ratio was 70 per cent rural to 30 urban; by the 
mid–60s it had become 40 rural to 60 urban. Peasants would leave the villages to 
become urban factory workers; in the new place they would be virtually alone. Even 
if the migration was done on a group basis, such groups would as a rule be broken 
quickly by the pressures of the new milieu. The only place where such a “displaced” 
individual would look for social assistance and contacts would be the same place 
where they earned their living: the factory. 
 
Given their traditionalistic mentality, such persons expect not to produce an 
infrastructure of their new urban lives, but to have it provided – like it was provided 
by their village community. Therefore, factory managers were expected to act in a 
paternalistic manner, providing housing, recreation and holiday basis, extra education 
and child care. Housing was a traditionally bad problem in such circumstances; 
getting it in a situation of constant shortage was rightly considered a privilege. 
 
So here we have a group of ex–peasants–become workers, urbanised together through 
the offices of their factory management, living together in the same apartment block 
provided by the factory, spending holidays in the same resort provided by the factory, 
and sending their kids to the same kindergarten provided by the factory. In all this 
they would still be different from the urban aborigines who, even if they worked in 
the same factory, would not need its paternalistic provisions to the same extent. 
 
This lifestyle engenders, of course, strong cohesive forces within the migrant group; it 
becomes a network in the above mentioned sense. In communist times political 
influence did not circulate through such networks, as politics was something for the 
“governing” alone. But when, with the advent of democracy, politics become the 
people's business as well, the urban networks were in place and ready. And they have 
become politically significant. 
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Networks: Collectivistic Vote 
 
With this in mind, when we go into the field, we test all communities studied, both 
rural and urban, for the presence of networks. To invent a Parkinsonian formula, the 
magnitude of the “network effect” is directly proportional to the physical distance 
from the capital of the country and inversely proportional to the number of network 
members. And the chance of political influence circulation in the network is directly 
proportional to the circulating of privilege in the network. In practice this means that 
urban networks would be exclusively prone to influence by the BSP: these networks 
were formed in communist times and members would be grateful for their lowly, yet 
privileged status to the communists. Theoretically, rural networks, formed on a 
traditional basis, could be influenced by any party; however, in practice they are again 
influenced mostly by the BSP, which appeals to a traditionalistic, collectivistic and 
less than sophisticated mentality. 
 
Traditionalistic network effects are most visible in small, mono–ethnic and relatively 
isolated villages. Here, it becomes very clear that feelings may be an individual 
matter, but thoughts are elaborated in common by the whole family; political attitudes 
are arrived at after habitual communal discussions. In this way, the entire community 
generates attitudes. 
 
Irrespective of their content, attitudes result in two types of political behaviour: 
reactive and active. Reactive political behaviour includes actions of the citisen which 
are the consequence of actions of the authorities (independent of whether these 
actions are directed at the citisen or not). Active political behaviour is the vote and the 
activities connected with voting. All citisen activities that aim at the use of authority 
and politics for personal gain (career, connections and so forth) should be considered 
separately. These actions can be classified as quasi–political behaviour, and they play 
a rather significant role (see Clientelism above). Quasi–political behaviour, oriented 
towards the improvement of an individual's social standing through a change in 
conditions, is virtually completely motivated by the frameworks and values of the 
specific community or network. In this sense, this kind of behaviour is locally rooted 
and its concrete patterns are of conjectural local interest only. 
 
Reactive behaviour, aimed at the amelioration of an individual's social status in 
existing conditions, is also motivated locally and can be interpreted with success only 
at the level of the local network. Active behaviour, in contrast to the other two types, 
does not pursue any kind of clear and defined aim of the individual. It has no direct 
link to the individual's social status, the latter being defined almost exclusively by 
tradition. 
 
From the point of view of the traditional rural networks, this type of behaviour is 
situated in the range from “a waste of time” to “doing evil”. Left to the community 
alone, this kind of behaviour would not exist. But it is not left to the community: it is 
being dictated from the centre of power – the capital city to which the community is 
by tradition subordinated, and the centre towards whose behaviour there is traditional 
conformity. And conformism is one of the key behavioural components of any 
traditional community. For this reason, the vote – and the whole inter–electoral and  
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pre–electoral problematic connected with it – comes as something alien. But it is a 
something that must be accepted and acted out. Otherwise, ultimately, “we go against 
the authorities” – which is “not the done thing”. 
 
The urban networks are differently situated: they are as islands in an amorphous sea 
of free agents, indulging in anonymous actions, which need to be motivated on a 
purely individual level. In this way, many city dwellers have evolved a behavioural 
complex which is motivated purely – or to a very great extent – on the individual 
level. When faced with voting, these city dwellers, in contrast to villagers or urban 
network members, can connect their voting behaviour to an already existing structure 
– but a structure which is of their own making, and not a structure imposed from the 
outside. For this reason, their voting behaviour is to a much greater extent 
individualised and 
rationalised. It is, however, to be noted that such an effect, while very obvious in the 
big cities like Sofia and Plovdiv, is almost unobservable in small towns like Ihtiman 
or Byala. 
 
 
Messages and Manipulation 
 
It seems that the way in which democratic politics is received has not changed 
significantly in comparison with the period between the two World Wars. Locally, the 
“modernistic” messages coming out of Sofia are inevitably translated into a  
traditional” language. In this translation, what is most frequently lost is precisely that 
which is essential from the point of view of Sofia. The result can be a rather absurd 
dialogue. Here is one typical illustration: 
 
Sofia: “Communists – out of power!” 
Village: “Good! Our mayor is a good man. (He happens to be a Communist)”. 
Sofia: Up with the UDF! Zhelyu (President Zhelev) is a traitor! 
Village: Exactly, we are all for Zhelyu, for the UDF. (The same pattern holds for 
Dogan, the MRF leader). 
 
A scandalous conclusion could be that between two–thirds and three–quarters of 
Bulgarian voters do not take part actively in the democratic process – because they do 
not vote for “individual” motives. (We assume that a politically motivated vote 
presupposes an informed choice aimed at individual maximisation of profit in a 
situation where political values are integrated into the values system of an individual 
and have no less a legitimacy than non–political values). 
 
This being the case, under existing democratic conditions (meaning that the 
authorities do not hinder these people from becoming active participants), in relation 
to such voters the authorities are not in the role of a democracy, but of a dictatorship 
and a manipulation. A dictatorship, because voters are coerced to obey the democratic 
rules of the game”; and a manipulation, because, once understanding the difficulties in 
communication, the centre can use them – and does use them – for its own gain, 
stimulating the periphery towards a behaviour that is profitable to the centre. 
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One of the possible manipulative conclusions – successfully verified during the 
election campaigns – is that it is senseless to “explain to the people” a given political 
line. At best the people would interpret the line in their own way, with unforeseeable 
results. On the other hand, one could push the suggestion that a given political line is 
the line of the authorities, of the “new behavioural fashion” approved by the centre. 
The aim would be to switch on the conformity complex. Also, local agitators have 
been successfully employed as “translators” of the centre's messages into the “local” 
language in such a way as to ensure that the translation fits the intentions of the 
centre. The reciprocal message that the center is getting “from below” is that a party 
needs an electorate, but that the electorate does not necessarily need a party. 
 
 
Opinion Polls: Consistency 
 
An interesting insight to voter attitudes may be gained through reactions to polling. 
No political opinion polls were conducted in Bulgaria during the communist 
dictatorship. The first was made only in December 1989. Pollsters at the time were 
dubious: they feared that respondents, who had all their lives learned to dissociate 
word from deed, would lie routinely when answering the questionnaire and produce 
multitudes of valueless artefacts. 
 
As it turned out, respondents for the most part would answer quite truthfully, making 
the poll meaningful. However, an unexpected phenomenon emerged: a respondent 
would answer different questions as if his or her political attitudes and position varied 
from question to question, frequently to opposite extremes. The phenomenon was 
attributed to the lack of “political personality” in the mentality of such respondents, 
who were numerous (about 20 per cent initially). An ad hoc “inconsistency scale” was 
designed, it being supposed that this phenomenon would trouble pollsters for quite 
some years. 
 
Unexpectedly, within 12 months such inconsistencies had disappeared altogether, and 
answers within one questionnaire followed an infallible (and rather dull) pattern. The 
most probable explanation seems to be the simplest: people learned where they stood 
with politics and began to understand the kind of choices involved. This positive 
individual reaction to a formidable social challenge allows one to end on a 
surprisingly optimistic note. 
 
 
Sofia 
July – August 1994 
 
 
Note. The conclusions of this paper are based on repeated representative quantitative 
opinion polls, quota elite and media polls, qualitative political anthropology surveys, 
and in–depth studies made by colleagues of the author and/or the author personally, 
beginning in the winter of 1989. 
